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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES: 
PRESENT BUT UNACCOUNTED FOR 
Honorable Philip M. Pro* 
The relationship between United States district judges and United States mag-
istrate judges is unique within the American judiciary. United States magistrate 
judges are the first judges encountered in most federal civil or criminal cases and 
play an increasingly important role in the adjudication of virtually every case in 
United States district court. Yet, while the behavior of Article III judges has been 
the subject of active academic scrutiny, the behavior of magistrate judges, who are 
appointed to renewable eight-year terms by their Article III district judge col-
leagues, has largely been ignored.1 This paper reports the results of interviews of 
thirty-four magistrate judges and district judges, and through their experiences, 
explores whether their judicial decision-making relationship, a motivation for re-
appointment, or elevation to Article III status influences their judicial behavior and 
that of their district judge colleagues. The answers to these questions are nuanced 
and dependent on variables not previously considered, and are best understood in 
the context of the remarkable evolution of the Magistrate Judges System, which has 
existed for less than fifty years. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central role played by judges in the American legal system is obvious. 
But as the views expressed by many who study, and endeavor to explain the 
behavior of American judges has shown, “the determinants of their decisions[] 
are not well understood . . . .”2 There are undoubtedly many reasons for this lack 
of understanding. Human behavior, judicial and otherwise, is difficult to under-
stand or quantify. Sometimes the data is limited and theoretical models are sub-
ject to genuine debate. This paper argues that the difficulty encountered in ex-
plaining the behavior of United States district judges is compounded by the 
failure to account for the evolving role of the United States magistrate judge, and 
a concomitant failure to adequately understand the judicial decision-making re-
lationship between magistrate and district court judges. 
The consequences of failing to account for magistrate judges when consid-
ering the judicial decision-making behavior of United States district judges are 
well illustrated in The Behavior of Federal Judges.3 This interesting book, writ-
ten by the formidable triumvirate of Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Judge 
Richard Posner, appeals to those seeking to more fully understand the judicial 
decision-making behavior of Justices of the United States Supreme Court, judges 
of the United States courts of appeals, and United States district court judges. 
The Behavior of Federal Judges has garnered widespread praise in academic cir-
cles and the popular media, and it has been characterized by Cass Sunstein as, 
“the most detailed and elaborate quantitative analysis of the federal judiciary to 
date.”4 However, this paper argues the authors’ analysis of the behavior of United 
States district judges is rendered less useful by their failure to account for the 
interrelationship between Article III district judges, and their non-Article III 
magistrate judge colleagues in the adjudicative process. That relationship has 
evolved substantially in recent decades. This paper will show that the impact of 
                                                        
2  LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 1 (2013). 
3  See generally id. 
4  Cass R. Sunstein, Moneyball for Judges: The Statistics of Judicial Behavior, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Apr. 9, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/112683/moneyball-judges [https://perma.cc/ 
KQW6-GZ2Y]; see also Sara C. Benesh, The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Study of Rational Choice, 23 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 312 (2013) (reviewing EPSTEIN 
ET AL., supra note 2), www.lpbr.net/2013/07/the-behavior-of-federal-judges.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6E2Z-X7SJ]; Adam Liptak, ‘Politicians in Robes’? Not Exactly, But . . . , N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/us/judges-rulings-follow-parti-
san-lines.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/98R5-26DC]. 
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this relationship on judicial decision-making behavior is apparent at almost every 
stage of the adjudicative process in civil and criminal cases litigated in United 
States district court.5 
Despite the pivotal role magistrate judges play in adjudicating civil and crim-
inal cases, with few exceptions,6 “[m]agistrate judges are an understudied group 
of judges; the literature on judging largely ignores them.”7 Why has this cadre of 
judges, who have become so important to the adjudication of cases in our federal 
courts, attracted such scant attention from the academy?8 One plausible explana-
tion may be because it is easier to focus on the Justices of the United States Su-
preme Court, and to a lesser degree, on judges of the United States courts of 
appeals because such scholarship is more likely to garner notoriety or praise 
within the academic community. The fact that data from these courts is plentiful, 
and so much already has been written about them, undoubtedly adds to their al-
lure. Additionally, although hundreds of thousands of litigants annually invoke 
the assistance of the federal trial courts to resolve significant disputes,9 the 
United States Supreme Court and the United States courts of appeals more 
broadly shape the life of the nation, and grapple with the weightiest constitu-
tional, legal, and policy issues of the day. 
Whatever the reason for the frequent omission, the academy’s failure to ac-
count for magistrate judges raises serious questions regarding the reliability of 
prior studies on the “determinants of [the] decisions” of United States district 
judges.10 Its omission further deprives us of insight into the determinants of the 
judicial decision-making behavior of magistrate judges, which so profoundly af-
fects the outcome of cases in United States district courts. 
This paper will first endeavor to fill the void by tracing the relevant history 
of the Magistrate Judges System and explaining the judicial decision-making role 
                                                        
5  See generally Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal 
Courts, 39 VAL. L. REV. 661, 661–62 (2005); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Meas-
ured Progress: The Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (1995). 
6  See generally Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 
1114–18 (2006); Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal 
District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 607 (2002). These, and several of the articles footnoted therein, contain thoughtful discus-
sions of the development of the Magistrate Judges System, and other non-life-tenured judicial 
positions within Article III courts. 
7  Mitu Gulati et al., In the Absence of Scrutiny: Narratives of Probable Cause 16 (Duke L. 
Sch., Working Paper, July 1, 2013), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship 
/3078 [https://perma.cc/E25P-6CE9]. 
8  “Academy” is the term of art used by the Duke University School of Law to refer to legal 
academia’s study of the law and legal profession. 
9  See generally Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S. CTS. www.uscourts.gov/report-
name/federal-court-management-statistics [https://perma.cc/B87H-9Z7D] (last visited Mar. 
11, 2016). 
10  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2. 
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currently played by magistrate judges in relation to their Article III district judge 
colleagues. Next, this paper will explain why the analysis of district judge be-
havior portrayed in The Behavior of Federal Judges is incomplete, based on its 
failure to account for the interrelationship between district and magistrate judges 
in deciding cases in United States district court. Finally, this paper reports the 
results of interviews from thirty-four magistrate and district judges within the 
United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit. These interviews explore the interre-
lationship between these Article III and non-Article III siblings in a manner de-
signed to elicit a better understanding of the influences on the judicial decision-
making behavior resulting from their unique relationship.  
The method for exploring the interrelationship between district and magis-
trate judges is fundamentally simple. The statutory framework and history of the 
Magistrate Judges System is readily available.11 Profiles of caseloads of the 
United States district courts, including the division of matters adjudicated by dis-
trict judges and magistrate judges, also are accessible through statistical caseload 
reports published annually by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts.12 This is important because it reflects the scope of cases adjudicated fully 
or in part by magistrate judges throughout the nation’s federal district courts. It 
further reveals the weakness of attempting to understand the judicial decision-
making behavior of United States district judges without accounting for the sig-
nificant role and influence of the associated magistrate judges.13 
More difficult to ascertain are the reasons why each district court utilizes 
magistrate judges differently. The statutory framework for the appointment and 
reappointment of magistrate judges, and for the duties that may statutorily be 
assigned to magistrate judges, are fixed.14 However, the actual duties delegated 
to magistrate judges are within the discretion of the district judges in each district 
and are not entirely uniform.15 
This paper proposes that the decisions of district judges regarding the selec-
tion and reappointment of magistrate judges, and the manner in which those mag-
istrate judges will be utilized, are significant judicial decisions which must be 
                                                        
11  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 72–73. See generally D. Nev. Loc. 
R. IB 1-1 to 1-9 (2011). 
12  See U.S. Magistrate Judges - Judicial Business 2014, U.S. CTS. (2014), http://www.uscou 
rts.gov/statistics-reports/us-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2014 
[https://perma.cc/H7S2-BLMU] [hereinafter Judicial Business]. 
13  The failure to account for the interrelationship between Article III district judges and non-
Article III magistrate judges is a bit like trying to understand the determinants of the decisions 
of Members of Congress by examining only one Chamber of that body. The results are meta-
phorically akin to the parable of the three blind men trying to describe an elephant by touching 
different parts of its body. 
14  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 636. 
15  The interviews of the thirty-five magistrate judges and district court judges recounted below 
illustrate how magistrate judges are used in varying capacities from district to district. See 
infra Part III. 
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considered because they dictate the respective judicial decision-making respon-
sibilities which will be exercised by district and magistrate judges in each dis-
trict. As the interviews of thirty-four magistrate judges and district judges dis-
cussed in Part III reveal, there are many reasons for this. Magistrate judges’ 
duties, and the interrelationship between magistrate judges and their Article III 
colleagues may vary depending upon the size, caseload needs, and experience or 
culture of each particular district. These, and other factors, also influence the 
selection and reappointment of magistrate judges. In sum, this paper will show 
that a combination of relevant factors influences and reflects the judicial deci-
sion-making behavior of district judges and magistrate judges, including the syn-
ergistic relationship between the two, which has previously been unaccounted 
for. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 
Today, lawyers entering any United States district court will immediately 
become familiar with the first judicial officer they likely will encounter: the 
United States magistrate judge. Yet a mere forty-seven years ago, magistrate 
judges did not even exist.16 A basic understanding of the history of the Magistrate 
Judges System is helpful to provide context for the current role of magistrate 
judges in the adjudication of cases in relation to their district judge colleagues.  
Four years after the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress authorized the judges 
of the United States circuit courts to appoint “discreet persons learned in the law” 
to take bail in criminal cases.17 In 1817, Congress first referred to these judicial 
officers as “commissioners” when it empowered them to assist federal judges in 
the taking of discovery in civil actions.18 In successive Judiciary Acts throughout 
the ensuing 150 years, Congress extended the authority of commissioners to as-
sist United States district courts with continually growing caseloads.19 Finally, 
in response to the recommendations of several members of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States and Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee con-
ducted hearings to consider comprehensive reform of the Commissioner System, 
resulting in enactment of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968.20 
                                                        
16  See Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 5. 
17  Judiciary Act of 1793 § 4, 1 Stat. 334 (1793). 
18  See Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of United States Com-
missioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (2006); Charles A. 
Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the United States Commissioner System, 14 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 1, 1–2 (1970). 
19  See generally MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, A GUIDE TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM (2009) (on file with au-
thor); Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343 
(1979); Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565 (1974). 
20  See Spaniol, supra note 19. See generally Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 § 101, 82 Stat. 
1108, 1108–14 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2000)). 
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The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 . . . represented the culmination of years of 
joint effort by Congress and the federal judiciary to improve the quality of justice 
and to expedite the disposition of the growing caseloads in the federal courts. The 
Act built upon and superseded the 175-year-old United States commissioner sys-
tem and created a unique corps of judicial officers, the United States magistrate 
judges.21  
As it has evolved, the Magistrate Judges System has continued to fulfill the ob-
jectives of Congress in enacting the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968: 
(1) in upgrading the status and quality of the first echelon of the federal judiciary; 
(2) in establishing an effective forum for the disposition of federal misdemeanor 
cases; (3) in providing needed assistance to district judges in the disposition of 
their civil and criminal cases; (4) in improving access to the federal courts for 
litigants; and (5) in providing the courts with a supplementary judicial resource to 
meet the ebb and flow of their caseload demands.22 
When the Magistrate Judges System commenced operation in July 1971, it 
was comprised of “82 full-time magistrates, 449 part-time magistrates, and 11 
combination referees in bankruptcy/magistrates and clerk/magistrates.”23 The 
magistrate judges were responsible for a significantly larger share of the work-
load of the federal courts than were the 700 United States commissioners they 
replaced.24 Since 1968, the Magistrate Judges System has evolved in a manner, 
which demonstrates the capacity of the largely self-governing federal judiciary, 
to address the growing, and increasingly complex civil and criminal caseloads 
that confront the federal courts. As of August 1, 2014, there were 534 full-time 
magistrate judge positions authorized throughout the ninety-four federal dis-
tricts, thirty-five part-time positions, and only three clerk/magistrate judge posi-
tions.25 
A magistrate judge is a judicial officer of the Article III United States district 
court.26 Congress has clearly provided in the Act that the role of a magistrate 
judge is to assist Article III judges, not to serve as a lower tier court.27 “The 
authority that a magistrate judge exercises is the jurisdiction of the district court 
itself, delegated to the magistrate judge by the district judges of the court under 
                                                        
21  Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 5; see also PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 10–12 (2014), http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/A-Guide-to-the-Fed-
eral-Magistrate-Judge-System.aspx?FT=.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HM6-4WST]. 
22  THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM 67 (1981). 
23  Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 5, at 1505. 
24  Id. 
25  E-mail from Thomas Davis, Attorney Advisor of the Judicial Servs. Office, to Philip Pro, 
Former Chief Judge of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Nev. (Aug. 31, 2015, 09:23 PST) 
[hereinafter Davis E-mail] (on file with author). 
26  28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012). 
27  See Brendan Linehan Shannon, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III Analysis 
for a New Breed of Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253, 265 (1991). 
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governing statutory authority and local rules of court.”28 As a result, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States consistently has encouraged Congress to estab-
lish all causes of action in the district court rather than mandating the reference 
of particular types of cases or proceedings to magistrate judges.29 
The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 grants each district court wide latitude 
to assign judicial duties to magistrate judges, enabling courts to take into account 
their own needs and conditions.30 The Act allows the utilization of magistrate 
judges, which manifests judicial decision-making behavior of the district judges 
of each district court, regarding the appointment of magistrate judges and by 
means of the allocation of case specific judicial duties and participation in mat-
ters of district court governance. These decisions are made, often in collaboration 
with their magistrate judge colleagues, in light of experience, and changes in the 
district’s caseload, resources, rules, or relevant statutory and case law. 
In federal criminal cases, virtually every initial proceeding, including deter-
minations regarding pretrial release or detention, is conducted before a magis-
trate judge.31 The issuance of search warrants, and the initiation of federal crim-
inal proceedings by a criminal complaint and arrest warrant, typically will be 
authorized by a magistrate judge.32 These are not perfunctory duties, but im-
portant proceedings in which the magistrate judges’ decisions can have a pro-
found impact on any criminal case. In many districts, a magistrate judge may 
adjudicate pre-trial discovery, and other non-dispositive motions.33 In some dis-
tricts, dispositive motions in felony cases also may be preliminarily decided by 
the magistrate judge on a report and recommendation to the district judge.34 Most 
trial proceedings and sentencings in non-felony cases will be conducted before a 
magistrate judge. In those districts with enormous criminal caseloads, some 
                                                        
28  ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL SERVS. OFFICE, INVENTORY OF UNITED STATES 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES DUTIES, http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-or-
des/Inventory.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4Y8-DPJ6]. The Inventory is a 251-page compilation of 
court decisions discussing various duties referred to magistrate judges by circuit. See also 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYS., SUGGESTIONS 
FOR UTILIZATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES, (2013) [hereinafter SUGGESTIONS] (on file with au-
thor). 
29  SUGGESTIONS, supra note 28. 
30  The specific provisions of the Act that govern magistrate judge authority are found at 28 
U.S.C. § 636 and 18 U.S.C. § 3401. In addition, other statutory grants of authority to magis-
trate judges appear throughout the United States Code, and the Federal Rules. 
31  See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012). 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
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change of plea proceedings in felony cases, and even jury selection in felony 
trials also may be conducted before a magistrate judge.35 
A review of the statistical reports of criminal matters adjudicated by magis-
trate judges for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2013, graphically 
illustrates the range of judicial decision-making duties discharged by magistrate 
judges.36 During that period, magistrate judges presided over 202,227 criminal 
proceedings, including 107,697 non-dispositive and 3,177 dispositive motions, 
conducted 38,072 pretrial conferences, took 30,726 guilty pleas, issued 62,575 
search warrants, and issued 53,202 arrest warrants.37 Magistrate judges also con-
ducted 101,349 initial appearances, 64,230 arraignments, and 49,936 detention 
(bail) hearings.38 Additionally, magistrate judges adjudicated 8,404 Class A mis-
demeanor cases, including non-jury and jury trials on consent of the parties, 
which otherwise would have remained on the trial docket of their district judge 
colleagues.39 
In most civil cases, the interaction of counsel and the parties with the mag-
istrate judge will be even greater. In many, if not most districts, magistrate judges 
conduct pretrial case management conferences, and adjudicate non-dispositive 
motions, including discovery matters, which can define the scope of the litiga-
tion. In some districts, magistrate judges preliminarily adjudicate dispositive mo-
tions, by making a report and recommendation to the assigned district judge. 
Magistrate judges also routinely conduct settlement conferences in civil cases as 
well as other court annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution programs offered in 
many district courts. Most significantly, on consent of the parties, the authority 
of a magistrate judge to fully and finally adjudicate all or any part of any civil 
case filed in United States district court either on motion, or by bench or jury 
trial, is almost unlimited under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).40 When this occurs, the case 
is entirely removed from the docket of the assigned district judge, and the as-
signed magistrate judge thereafter acts as a de facto Article III judge, with appeal 
available directly to the pertinent court of appeals. 
Whatever the utilization scheme employed, the statistical profile for civil 
matters adjudicated by magistrate judges for the twelve-month period ending 
September 30, 2013, again, is dramatic.41 During that period, magistrate judges 
adjudicated 229,199 non-dispositive motions, typically discovery motions, and 
                                                        
35  In the author’s experience and personal knowledge, receiving pleas of guilty and selecting 
juries in felony criminal cases has become common in the District of Arizona, Tucson Divi-
sion, and the Southern District of California, as a result of their comparatively high criminal 
caseloads. 
36  See Judicial Business, supra note 12, at Table S-17. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6) (2012) (stating that Class A misdemeanors are offenses pun-
ishable for one year or less, but more than six months). 
40  28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012); FED R. CIV. P. 73. 
41  See Judicial Business, supra note 12, at Table S-17. 
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21,991 dispositive motions in civil cases not involving prisoners.42 These were 
typically motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, either fully decided on 
consent of the parties, or via report and recommendations to a district judge. 
Magistrate judges also conducted 56,812 pretrial conferences, and 22,757 settle-
ment conferences.43 In the arena of prisoner habeas and civil rights litigation, 
magistrate judges fully adjudicated, or recommended disposition to a district 
judge, 8,681 state habeas, and 3,281 federal habeas cases, and 14,268 prisoner 
civil rights cases.44 Most significantly, during that same twelve-month period, 
magistrate judges fully adjudicated 15,803 civil cases on consent of the parties 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), including 313 jury trials, and 143 non-jury trials, 
which represents 14 percent of the civil jury trials conducted in the United States 
district courts during that period.45 
Recalling the parable of the boatload of statisticians who drowned in a lake 
averaging two feet in depth, mere statistical profiles can be deceiving. While the 
statistics above demonstrate the substantial utilization of magistrate judges to 
handle an ever-growing array of civil and criminal matters, they must be under-
stood in relation to the overall caseloads of the United States district courts. An 
important but previously unaccounted for example of judicial decision-making 
behavior by district judges also is reflected in the statistical profiles above. Ex-
cept for cases proceeding before the magistrate judge for full adjudication on 
consent of the parties, each ruling by a magistrate judge on a non-dispositive or 
dispositive motion reflected above is subject to review on objections (appeal) 
before the assigned district judge.46 More significantly, the statistical profiles 
represent a fundamental manifestation of judicial decision-making behavior by 
United States district judges in allocating case specific decision-making respon-
sibilities to magistrate judges within their districts. 
One reason district judges have come to rely so heavily on magistrate judges 
to undertake such substantial adjudicative responsibilities is easy to discern: 
since the inception of the Magistrate Judges System, federal criminal and civil 
caseloads have continued to grow in number and complexity. The concomitant 
inability to secure Congressional authorization for additional Article III judge-
ships to meet the needs of growing caseloads, and the incapacity of the Executive 
and Legislative Branches to fill vacant Article III judgeships, makes reliance on 
magistrate judges to help fill the gap understandable. This is particularly so given 
that it is the district judges in each district who select new magistrate judges, 
                                                        
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the ruling by a magistrate judge on a non-dispositive mo-
tion is subject to review by the district judge on a clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard. 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a recommendation for final ruling by a magistrate judge on a 
case dispositive motion is subject to de novo review by the assigned district judge. 
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decide whether to reappoint incumbent magistrate judges, and define the scope 
of the judicial work they will perform.47 
Another significant manifestation of judicial decision-making behavior by 
district judges is found in the manner in which magistrate judges are appointed 
to the district court. The selection process for magistrate judges is rigorous, and 
substantially different from that utilized by the Executive and Legislative 
Branches for Article III judges, mostly because it does not involve the political 
nomination by the President affiliated with a particular political party and con-
firmed by the United States Senate.48 Yet by any measure, the process for ap-
pointing magistrate judges has produced a cadre of over 500 highly competent 
and diverse federal judges comprising a significant number of the total judges in 
the United States district courts.49 
Today, remarkably talented state judges and lawyers increasingly apply for 
vacant magistrate judge positions. The Federal Magistrates Act established cer-
tain minimum standards and procedures for filling vacant magistrate judge posi-
tions, for creating new magistrate judge positions, and for the selection and ap-
pointment or reappointment of magistrate judges.50 Before a vacancy in a 
magistrate judge position may be filled or a new magistrate judge position may 
be authorized, the district court must obtain approval of the judicial council for 
its circuit.51 The Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the 
Magistrate Judges System also must review the request, and the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States must grant final authorization.52 Hence, while not re-
lated to specific judicial decision-making behavior on the merits of a particular 
case, the process for establishing and filling magistrate judge positions reflects 
the judicial behavior of the judges of the requesting district court, with respect to 
court governance. It also offers insight into judicial decision-making with respect 
to the division of civil and criminal case related responsibilities (utilization) 
among the Article III and non-Article III judges of that court. Presumably district 
judges select, and reappoint, those they consider to be the best magistrate judges 
from each available group of candidates, and they do so without the partisan po-
litical “kabuki” that sometimes plagues the selection and confirmation of Article 
III judges. 
                                                        
47  See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012). 
48  See id. 
49  As of September 30, 2013, there were 677 authorized Article III district judgeships, but 
seventy-five of those were vacant pending nomination and confirmation of new district judges. 
Davis E-mail, supra note 25. There also were 346 senior district judges handling a significant 
number of cases in the district courts. Id. As of August 1, 2015, there were 534 full-time, and 
thirty-five part-time magistrate judges, and seventy-one retired magistrate judges serving on 
recall for up to five years in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 375(a)(1). Id. 
50  See 28 U.S.C. § 631. 
51  Id. at (f). 
52  Id. at (a). 
 
PRO - 16 NEV L.J. 783 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:59 PM 
Summer 2016] PRESENT BUT UNACCOUNTED FOR 793 
II. THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 
In the General Introduction to The Behavior of Federal Judges, the authors 
explain their reason for omitting consideration of magistrate judges as follows: 
Data availability and a desire to keep the book to a manageable length have per-
suaded us to limit our analyses to the federal judiciary, and specifically to the 
Article III federal judiciary . . . . There are other federal judicial officers, primarily 
federal magistrate judges[,] . . . but they are not appointed by the President or 
confirmed by the Senate, and have fixed terms of office rather than life tenure.53 
Thereafter, the only substantive discussion of magistrate judges is found 390 
pages later, where the authors note in their Conclusion the decision to limit the 
scope of their book to certain Article III judges.54 The authors place magistrate 
judges with bankruptcy judges, Tax Court judges, Article I administrative law 
judges, state judges, and foreign judges as inapposite to their study.55 They ex-
plain this omission as necessary to reduce the variance in their data, “and thus 
the range of testable hypotheses that can be derived from a labor-market theory 
of judicial behavior.”56 
Naturally the authors are free to define the scope of their study. However, 
unlike the wide array of other judges omitted, the authors’ failure to account for 
over 500 magistrate judges in conjunction with their analysis of district judges, 
arguably limits the validity of several of the conclusions reached regarding nearly 
seventy-five percent of the Article III judges studied in their book.57 
The theme of The Behavior of Federal Judges is a familiar and recurring 
one: “[T]he behavior of American judges, and in particular the determinants of 
their decisions, are not well understood . . . by lawyers, law professors, and even 
many judges . . . .”58 In part, the authors attribute the difficulty in understanding 
judges’ behavior to their assertion that, “judges in our system are permitted to 
be, and most are, quite secretive.”59 Hence, explain the authors, “indirect meth-
ods must be employed to understand their behavior,” including “sophisticated 
theoretical concepts and quantitative tools to penetrate self-serving judicial rhet-
oric, go beyond judges’ limited self-understanding, and place the study of judi-
cial behavior on a scientific basis.”60 The authors also seek to determine whether 
                                                        
53  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. 
54  Id. at 397. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  My attempt at calculating this percentage is based on current Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts statistics showing a total of 1,023 (677 active and 346 senior) district 
judges, 268 circuit judges (179 active and eighty-nine senior) and nine Supreme Court Justices. 
Although not all vacancies on the district courts or courts of appeal are currently filled, I am 
confident that the final nine is accurate. 
58  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 1–2. 
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an aversion to reversal,61 effort aversion and leisure preference,62 or a desire for 
promotion, influence judicial behavior.63 Grounded in their debatable assump-
tion of secrecy, the authors outline their intention to offer an explanation of ju-
dicial behavior that falls between the legalism or formalism theory, in which ca-
reerism and ideology play no role in judicial decisions, and the polar opposite 
theory of realism in which judges are simply politicians in robes who employ 
“legalist pretensions . . . to conceal the political character of their rulings.”64 
No doubt the use of sophisticated theoretical concepts and quantitative tools 
wielded by able political scientists, economists, psychologists, lawyers, or judges 
can penetrate self-serving judicial rhetoric, and circumvent judges’ limited self-
understanding. The task is made easier, but arguably less reliable, when the au-
thors fail to square their analysis with the views of the judges they study. This 
paper suggests the authors’ analysis of district judge behavior is weakened fur-
ther by the failure to account, directly or indirectly, for the role of the magistrate 
judge in the adjudicative process. 
Certain other weaknesses are apparent in The Behavior of Federal Judges 
and warrant comment.65 First, in their Introduction, the authors correctly state, 
“the vast majority of [federal district court] cases are decided without a trial.”66 
However, in the very same sentence they parenthetically opine, without any ev-
ident basis, that these cases are resolved “often without any significant judicial 
proceedings, being settled or abandoned early in the litigation.”67 
Undoubtedly, a number of cases filed in United States district courts lack 
even arguable merit. Also, many cases are resolved early in the litigation process, 
but this does not support the authors’ assertion that the majority of cases are re-
solved often without any significant judicial proceedings. The mountain of dis-
positive and non-dispositive motions adjudicated in the district courts by district 
and magistrate judges strongly suggest otherwise. Moreover, it is unclear what 
the authors mean by “significant judicial proceedings.”68 They do not distinguish 
between rulings made exclusively by district judges, or by magistrate judges, or 
                                                        
61  For district judges, The Behavior of Federal Judges characterizes “reversal aversion” as a 
motivator when “they cannot be confident that the appellate court will defer to an ideologically 
colored exercise of discretion . . . .” See id. at 12. 
62  The Behavior of Federal Judges defines “effort aversion” as including a reluctance to work 
“too” hard (leisure preference), and a reluctance to quarrel with colleagues (conflict aversion). 
Id. at 7. 
63  Id. at 4, 13. 
64  Id. at 2. 
65  While I find other portions of The Behavior of Federal Judges worthy of comment, partic-
ularly as they relate to the analysis of the judicial decision-making behavior of United States 
district judges, they are not relevant to the interrelationship between district and magistrate 
judges. Hence, they are not discussed herein. 
66  Id. at 10. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
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by a combination of the two.69 Are the authors referring to rulings, which are 
dispositive of the case before the district court, including such matters as motions 
to remand to state court, which may not be subject to review by the court of 
appeals, or only rulings to which the authors ascribe some behavioral driver? If 
the latter, the authors are entitled to their opinion even though it is offered with-
out empirical evidence, or even minimal analysis. If the former, the empirical 
basis is, at best, gossamer. 
Indeed, the authors’ parenthetical conclusion is contradicted in the same par-
agraph, wherein they note that “[d]istrict courts therefore hear a higher percent-
age of cases that can be disposed of readily by the application of legalist concepts 
than courts of appeal do.”70 From this, the reader might conclude, either that the 
authors do not consider legalist concepts such as standing, ripeness, and moot-
ness to be significant judicial rulings, or that ideology has no role in the applica-
tion of such judge-made doctrines, at least not in comparison to the ideology 
employed at the appellate level. 
Again the reader is left to wonder how the authors view the significance, 
either in an ideological and behavioral sense, or a case dispositive sense, of cases 
resolved not only by district judges, but also by or in conjunction with magistrate 
judges. Here, countless examples could be found in rulings by both district and 
magistrate judges on motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, or for failure to 
state a claim, or perhaps, on a claim of immunity, or on a motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief. Nor do the authors explain the significance they would ascribe 
to rulings on motions relating to discovery issues which implicate cost and bur-
den of litigation, or claims of privilege, or trade secrets, to name but a few. Cer-
tainly they do not speak to the significance of rulings, early or otherwise, in crim-
inal cases, such as motions to suppress evidence, post-arrest statements or 
identification, or of motions to dismiss an indictment, or to sever or join defend-
ants, or for the production of exculpatory or impeaching evidence, all of which 
tend to influence plea negotiations and hence, take the form of what may be fairly 
characterized as dispositive of the case. 
The reader, particularly one who presides or litigates frequently in the United 
States district court, is further left to ponder how the authors factor in the moun-
tainous caseload of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus, con-
sidered as frequently by magistrate judges as by district judges.71 Such cases of-
ten entail the review of entire state court criminal trial proceedings, or the review 
of quasi-trial proceedings occurring before a variety of administrative tribunals 
or Article I courts within the Executive Branch, such as Social Security appeals.72 
                                                        
69  See generally id. 
70  Id. at 10. Examples of “legalist concepts” offered by the authors include “standing, ripeness, 
and mootness, and doctrines that allow early dismissal of weak cases.” Id. 
71  This assertion is based on the author’s personal and professional experience. 
72  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2012). 
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In Chapter five, titled The District Courts and the Selection Effect, the au-
thors begin with an acknowledgment that “[f]ederal district judges have received 
less attention in academic studies of judicial behavior than Supreme Court Jus-
tices and court of appeals judges.”73 They offer several reasons, with the last 
being most curious: 
[I]nformation about district court decisions is hard to come by because most are 
decided without written opinion, often on procedural grounds and rarely after a 
trial—in the 12-month period ending in March 2009, fewer than 2 percent of the 
237,802 civil cases filed in district courts resulted in a judgment after trial.74 
Here, the logical connection between the existence of written opinions and 
the percentage of cases resolved by trial is somewhat elusive. The fact that not 
every ruling finally adjudicating a case in the United States district court includes 
a detailed written opinion does not necessarily render the rationale for disposition 
“hard to come by.”75 Virtually every order or opinion, case dispositive or other-
wise, rendered by a district judge or magistrate judge, is available on PACER,76 
or on legal research services such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, regardless of 
whether it is a published or unpublished ruling. Additionally, a great many rul-
ings disposing of cases in United States district court are made in open court after 
oral argument, generally with a full explanation by the judge of the basis for the 
ruling.77 
Moreover, the authors do not explain what they have learned from the two 
percent of cases adjudicated at trial, or what they might expect to find were a 
greater percentage of the 237,802 cases actually tried. Undoubtedly, some civil 
and criminal cases involve issues that can be resolved only through the trial pro-
cess.78 However, the majority of the civil trials that comprise the two percent 
cited by the authors could just as well consist of cases that could not be adjudi-
cated on summary judgment because they turned on issues of credibility of wit-
nesses; or cases which barely survived summary judgment but lack substantial 
merit and are being tried in an attempt to recover attorney’s fees; or cases that 
proceeded to trial due to an uncontrollable client; or a pro se litigant who pos-
sessed unrealistic expectations. Once again, no consideration is given to the role 
played by magistrate judges in the cases involved, or to the decision-making be-
havior of the district judges involved concerning how to utilize their magistrate 
judges in assisting with the resolution of these cases. 
Ultimately, the authors may well have achieved the worthy goal of adding 
to the growing knowledge of the judicial behavior of judges appointed in con-
formity with Article III of the Constitution, with regard to Justices who sit on the 
                                                        
73  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 207. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  See PUB. ACCESS TO CT ELECTRONIC RECS. (PACER), www.pacer.gov [https://perma.cc/ 
9VKZ-EM8R] (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
77  This assertion is based on the author’s professional experience. 
78  See generally Philip M. Pro, Mis(understanding)judging, 7 NEV. L.J. 480 (2007). 
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United States Supreme Court, or judges on the United States courts of appeals. 
However, the interviews conducted of district judges and magistrate judges, as 
outlined below, suggest the authors’ attempt to explain the behavior of United 
States district judges is weakened because their analysis fails to account for the 
impact of the decision-making by magistrate judges in the cases considered and 
the interrelationship between district judges and magistrate judges in the adjudi-
cative process. 
III. THE EXPERIENCES OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES AND DISTRICT JUDGES IN THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Most cases flowing through the federal judicial system begin in the United 
States district courts. Most end there as well. Given the enormous role magistrate 
judges play in that adjudicative process, a thorough understanding of the judicial 
decision-making behavior of district judges is incomplete if the analysis fails to 
account for the relationship between the magistrate judges and district judges 
involved. 
I have thought about the subject of the development of the Magistrate Judges 
System for a long time. It is only natural that I should do so given my service as 
a magistrate judge from 1980 to 1987, and thereafter for twenty-eight years as a 
district judge, which entailed daily interaction with magistrate judges, participa-
tion in the selection of twelve new magistrate judges, and the reappointment of 
eight.79 Hopefully, these experiences give me some insight regarding the subject. 
Arguably they color, or even distort, some of my observations. This is a human 
affliction undoubtedly shared with others who have written on the subject of ju-
dicial behavior. Accepting such limitations, my experiences, and those of others 
who sit as United States district judges and magistrate judges, may nonetheless 
be useful to understanding judicial decision-making behavior in an environment 
as dynamic as the United States district courts. 
For those actually engaged in the process, judicial decision-making is almost 
always a humbling experience. Every day, constitutional, statutory, and human 
issues surge up against the walls of our federal trial courts, challenging the ca-
pacity of every district and magistrate judge to fairly resolve the conflicts before 
them. The environment in which trial judges function is dynamic, and the land-
scape frequently changes, requiring judges to cope with shifts in caseloads, re-
ductions in funding and staffing, or significant changes in applicable law, among 
others. 
Although district judges are appointed for life in accord with Article III of 
the Constitution, they come and go.80 Some assume senior status, others fully 
                                                        
79  Additionally, I served as Chair of the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee 
on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System from 1993 to 1998, and also as Chief 
Judge of the District of Nevada from 2002 to 2007, during which, among other duties, I was 
responsible for oversight of magistrate judges in my District. 
80  U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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retire, and inevitably, our terms end at some point. When this occurs, new judges 
join the bench with a variety of professional and life experiences. So it is with 
magistrate judges. Just as the balance or personality of the United States Supreme 
Court changes with each new Justice, so too does the personality of each district 
court change over time, and such change may influence the judicial decision-
making behavior of district and magistrate judges. Indeed, the utilization of mag-
istrate judges, and the relationship between the district judges and magistrate 
judges in each of the ninety-four districts is of necessity, dynamic. Over forty 
years of experience has shown that flexibility in the utilization of magistrate 
judges is essential to enable each district court to cope with the equally dynamic 
landscape of evolving caseloads, the culture of the local legal community, and 
the ever-changing makeup of the individuals who occupy the relevant Article III 
and non-Article III judgeships.81 
Examining the models of magistrate judge utilization employed by the vari-
ous district courts provides a useful vehicle to consider the judicial decision-
making behavior of magistrate judges and district judges. Models for magistrate 
judge utilization are, to a degree, reflected in the local rules of each district court, 
and their public court web sites.82 Also useful are the readily available annual 
statistical reports produced by the Administrate Office of the United States 
Courts, which document the vast array of civil and criminal cases fully, or par-
tially, adjudicated by magistrate judges which otherwise would be left exclu-
sively to the district judges of their court.83 A tour of the statutory changes in the 
Federal Magistrates Act since 1968, and related changes to the Federal Rules of 
Civil and Criminal Procedure, further reflects the evolving nature of the Magis-
trate Judges System over the past forty-six years.84 Particularly important in this 
regard is 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), which provides, “[a] magistrate judge may be 
assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.”85 Augmented by changes in case law from the various 
circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, relating to magistrate judges,86 
                                                        
81  The dynamic nature of caseloads in the ninety-four United States district courts, combined 
with the evolving nature of magistrate judge utilization, pose a potential danger to those rely-
ing on calcified data sets in support of contemporary conclusions regarding judicial decision-
making behavior. 
82  See, e.g., D. Nev. Loc. R., IB 1-1 (2011), http://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/Files/LOCAL 
%20RULES%20OF%20PRACTICE%20August%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/98XY-
QD8W]. 
83  See generally id. 
84  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3060 (2012). 
85  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). 
86  While an in depth exploration of significant case law critical to the development of the 
Magistrate Judges System is beyond the scope of this paper, the profound influence of Su-
preme Court precedent on the role played by non-Article III magistrate judges, and bankruptcy 
judges, has rarely been more evident than in the recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Wellness Int’l Network, LTD. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). While Wellness ad-
dresses the circumstances under which Article III of the Constitution permits bankruptcy 
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this provision of the Act has created the floor for the measured development of 
the Magistrate Judges System, flowing not only from the top down, but also per-
colating from the bottom up. 
As useful as the foregoing analytical avenues may be, surely there is more 
we can do to better understand the current behavior of United States district 
judges and magistrate judges, and the determinants of their judicial decisions. 
One straightforward way to reach beyond these limitations is to ask the judges 
themselves. So that is what I have done. 
I am not an anthropologist, and have no special skill in ethnography. How-
ever, in deference to Margaret Mead, I have “liv[ed] with the natives,” and shared 
their way of life thereby acquiring some capacity to see the world through their 
eyes.87 Borrowing from the technique of those skilled in the art of ethnographic 
interview, I have tried to reach beyond personal experience to capture an under-
standing of the judicial decision-making relationship between district judges and 
magistrate judges in the words, stories, and experiences of those who live them. 
There are, of course, reasonable limits to reliance on self-reporting by subjects 
who may be viewed as offering their comments with a self-serving gloss. The 
tenor of the responses received during the interviews recounted herein suggests 
that most judges are made of sterner stuff. When speaking of their judicial deci-
sion-making behavior on the bench, and the behavior of colleagues, most display 
admirable insight, and a capacity to penetrate self-serving judicial rhetoric. 
Reporting on such interviews, however, is a delicate matter, and my assess-
ment of the tenor of their responses is admittedly subjective. The judges I inter-
viewed are professional colleagues, and they rely on my assurance of confiden-
tiality that will be rigorously maintained. It is not possible to recount fully 
everything said by each judge interviewed, and undoubtedly some useful insights 
conveyed will be missed. However, while this interview approach may not per-
mit comment about a particular judge, or even anonymously their experiences in 
a particular district, it does permit the development of some data points grounded 
in the thoughts, experiences, and actions of actual members of the cadre of judges 
being studied.88 
                                                        
courts to exercise the judicial power of the United States on the basis of party consent, and 
also the circumstances under which consent can be implied by a party’s conduct, the case also 
has implications for magistrate judge consent authority. Id. at 1948–49. See generally Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012); Frazin v. 
Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 732 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2013); Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 
F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013); cases discussed in Douglass A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing 
Less Than Indispensable:” The Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utili-
zation in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845, 900–04 (2016).  
87  John M. Conley, Tales of Diversity: Lawyers’ Narratives of Racial Equity in Private Firms, 
31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 831, 832 (2006). 
88  It is enough that others skilled in the use of indirect analytical methods should do so. See 
supra Part II. 
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The interviews reported also permit some generalization where the magis-
trate judges and district judges interviewed repeatedly identified similar issues, 
and discussed them in similar terms in response to common questions posed, or 
sometimes offered spontaneously. In this respect, it is important to capture not 
only what those interviewed said, but how they said it. Admittedly, fifty hours 
of interviews conducted of thirty-four Ninth Circuit magistrate judges and dis-
trict judges, many of whom formerly served as magistrate judges, cannot allow 
sweeping quantitative assertions regarding the views or experiences of all United 
States district and magistrate judges in every district court, regardless of size. 
Nor can it fully account for their geographic, demographic, or caseload diversity. 
However, it does reflect a representative sampling of judges in most of the fifteen 
districts within the Ninth Circuit,89 which is by any measure, at least at the level 
of the district courts, a reasonable microcosm of the federal judiciary. 
So let us turn to some of the responses of those interviewed, and explore how 
the judges themselves describe the judicial decision-making relationship be-
tween district judges and magistrate judges, and the influences of that interrela-
tionship on their behavior. Let us explore further whether aversion to reversal, 
effort aversion, leisure preference, or a desire for promotion, discussed in The 
Behavior of Federal Judges as arguably influential factors for Article III judges, 
also influence the judicial behavior of magistrate judges. The interviews of the 
magistrate judges and district judges recounted below provide interesting and 
useful information relating to the questions above. 
A. The Influence of the Prospect of Review by a District Judge on the Judicial 
Decision-Making of Magistrate Judges 
Judicial decision-making in the United States district court, or any other 
court, does not occur in a vacuum. It is impossible to identify, or quantify, all of 
the factors, which may influence the judicial decision-making process, but one 
factor may be the prospect of review by a higher court. In a seminal act of judicial 
decision-making, the district judges of each district define the universe of possi-
bilities when they make the initial decision regarding what types of matters will 
be referred to a magistrate judge for adjudication, in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 636. 
Thereafter, review of judicial decisions made by magistrate judges generally 
occurs in three ways. First, where the magistrate judge is acting with full case 
dispositive authority, on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), 
review occurs by appeal to the pertinent United States court of appeals.90 Here 
again, the assigned district judge exhibits another act of judicial decision-making 
                                                        
89  The 15 districts of the Ninth Circuit include Alaska, Arizona, California Central, California 
Eastern, California Northern, California Southern, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Washington Eastern, and Washington Western. The judges 
interviewed herein represent twelve of those districts, excluding only Guam, Northern Mari-
ana Islands, and Eastern Washington. 
90  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (2012). 
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behavior, because before a § 636(c) consent by the parties becomes effective, the 
transfer first must be approved by that district judge.91 Second, where the mag-
istrate judge is adjudicating a non-case dispositive motion in a civil or criminal 
case, also assigned to a district judge, the ruling of the magistrate judge is subject 
to review by that district judge under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” 
standard, in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).92 Third, where a magistrate 
judge is ruling on a case dispositive motion in a civil or criminal case by means 
of “findings . . . and recommendation” to the assigned district judge, the ruling 
is subject to de novo review by that district judge in accord with 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 636(b)(1)(B)–(C).93 
When confronted with the question whether their judicial decision-making 
on the merits of a case was influenced by the prospect of review of their rulings 
by the district judges, who may ultimately determine whether they will be reap-
pointed to an additional eight-year term, the responses of both the magistrate 
judges and the district judges were consistent. Virtually all responded without 
equivocation that such a consideration played no role in their judicial decision-
making behavior on the merits of a case. The chorus of responses was best stated 
by one district judge—who previously served as a magistrate judge—when he 
said, “Not for a second.”94 The general sentiment of incumbent magistrate judges 
was well captured by one who said, “I’d rather do what I think is right in a case 
and lose my job, than do what I didn’t think was right just to keep my job.”95 
One or two such responses might be viewed as pretentious. However, the fact 
that such reactions were common suggests a firmly held attitude on the part of 
both magistrate judges and district judges. 
Predictably, all magistrate judges reported that they valued their judicial rep-
utations, and stated that even though they knew they could not please all parties 
in a case with their rulings, at a minimum they wanted to convey to the parties 
that they had fairly considered their arguments, and had rendered the best deci-
sion they could in accord with the applicable facts and law. The sentiment ex-
pressed by most was summed up by one magistrate judge who noted that, “Un-
like an associate in a law firm whose ass is on the line for errors which cost the 
firm clients and money, the currency of a judge is different. It is almost exclu-
sively credibility. You want to be known as a capable and fair judge.”96 Another 
magistrate judge pointed out that it would be very difficult to do otherwise, as 
                                                        
91  Id. § 636(c)(1). 
92  Id. § 636(b)(1)(A). 
93  Id. § 636(b)(1). 
94  Interview with subject 13 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). As I promised all interview subjects that 
I would not identify them, directly or indirectly, the only citation I will provide for each quote 
is the random number I have assigned to the particular subjects. The interviews are on file with 
the author. 
95  Interview with subject 21 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
96  Interview with subject 5 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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that would entail the nearly impossible task of trying to accommodate the pro-
clivities of multiple district judges in a wide variety of cases subject to review. 
Instead, the best approach was to do the “best you could and let the chips fall 
where they may.”97 
One magistrate judge, with substantial prior experience in both criminal and 
civil law practice, explained that he would not “brook direction to a particular 
decision,” noting that he did not “need the job to survive.” He speculated, how-
ever, that those who had spent a lifetime in government service might feel oth-
erwise.98 Based on the interviews conducted, it is not clear that it does. Only two 
magistrate judges reported instances where they received a referral of a case dis-
positive motion for preparation of a report and recommendation with an indica-
tion from the referring district judge of the preferred outcome. Both magistrate 
judges indicated that they made it clear to the referring district judge that they 
would make an independent decision on the matter.99 However, the specter that 
this may occur in other cases, or with other judges, is a matter that deserves fur-
ther study because such a referral has the clear potential of influencing the judi-
cial decision-making of the magistrate judge. It is not clear that all magistrate 
judges would respond in the same manner as the two magistrate judges receiving 
the referrals above. Perhaps the response would depend not only on the manner 
in which the referral was couched, but also on the relationship between the dis-
trict judge and magistrate judge involved, whether the magistrate judge was con-
fronting reappointment, or other more nuanced factors. 
Most magistrate judges expressed the view that they felt the reason they had 
been selected by the district judges of their court was because they were highly 
qualified and could be relied upon to call each case on the merits as they thought 
the law and facts required, rather than based upon some other internal or external 
influence. Responding district judges expressed the same sentiment. Indeed, for 
some district judges, influence occasionally seemed to run the other way. For 
example, a few district judges expressed the view that they considered it im-
portant to “back up” the magistrate judge when objections were taken to a mag-
istrate judge’s discovery rulings.100 
Some magistrate judges acknowledged the presence of a limited influence, 
not on the merits of a particular motion, but on the manner in which they priori-
tized or organized their judicial decision-making. For example, some magistrate 
                                                        
97  Interview with subject 19 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
98  Interview with subject 11 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
99  Interview with subjects 20, 34 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
100  Interview with subjects 14, 15 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). As the author of this paper, I must 
avoid personal “war stories,” but can attest to the phenomenon above from my experiences as 
a magistrate judge managing pretrial discovery in the MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litigation, 
MDL-453, in the early 1980’s. There, the presiding district judge, Louis C. Bechtle, of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, provided the kind of discovery ruling “back up,” which ren-
dered almost non-existent objections to my rulings on non-dispositive motions. 
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judges responded that when addressing pre-trial case management and discovery 
issues in a civil case, it was fairly common for them to consider what they un-
derstood to be the general preference of the assigned district judge, regarding 
such matters as the extension of discovery cut-off dates, continuances of trials, 
or other case management guidelines known to them by either express policy, or 
experience with a particular district judge.101 As one district judge, who formerly 
served as a magistrate judge, commented, “I would generally ask myself, how 
will this affect the case before the district judge?”102 Another former magistrate 
judge, now serving as a district judge, said, “You are always mindful that what 
you do will have an impact on a case which is assigned to another judge, but it 
is still your job to exercise your independent judgment in deciding the matter 
before you.”103 A current magistrate judge characterized the relationship between 
district judges and magistrate judges as “symbiotic” in that each relies on the 
other to discharge the judicial decision-making responsibilities in a manner that 
jointly moves the case toward resolution.104 
In sum, the magistrate judges interviewed identified no general influence 
from the specter of review by their fellow district judges. Most noted that their 
rulings on non-dispositive matters were rarely reversed by the assigned district 
judge, and that reversals on findings and recommendations, with respect to case 
dispositive matters, also were infrequent but not particularly troubling due, in 
large part, to the fact that ultimate responsibility for final adjudication of the case 
was vested with the district judge. Of course, where the magistrate judge was 
fully responsible for adjudicating the case on consent of the parties, the prospect 
of review by a district judge was non-existent. 
B. The Influence of Coordination and Mentoring 
It is not surprising that some coordination in judicial decision-making occurs 
between district and magistrate judges even as they discharge separate decision-
making responsibilities on the same case. The interviews conducted show the 
degree of coordination was not the same in every district due in part to the dif-
ferent sizes of the districts, the varying nature of the caseloads from district to 
district, and the experience levels and personalities of the judges involved. The 
influence of mentoring between district and magistrate judges is, however, a bit 
more surprising. As explained below, perhaps it should not be. 
Case specific coordination between district and magistrate judges was more 
pronounced with respect to complex civil litigation where the district judge and 
magistrate judge had actually discussed a plan for case management specific to 
                                                        
101  Interview with subject 22 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014) (and many others). 
102  Interview with subject 16 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
103  Interview with subject 2 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
104  Interview with subject 5 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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the case. Some judges reported examples of case management conferences pre-
sided over jointly by the district judge and magistrate judge assigned to the case 
as a viable means of developing with counsel a workable case management pro-
tocol.105 Additionally, in those districts where magistrate judges were heavily 
relied upon to handle pretrial case management and discovery motions in civil 
cases, several noted that their pretrial rulings helped define the parameters of the 
case for both the parties and the assigned district judge. The judicial decision-
making of magistrate judges in this regard would seem to influence the parame-
ters of summary judgment motions later filed, the scope of trial before the district 
judge, and the boundaries of potential settlement. 
However, one magistrate judge captured the sentiment expressed by several 
others when observing that, “Our heavy caseloads often inhibit case specific col-
laboration on pretrial case management in most cases.”106 This was a source of 
frustration for some magistrate judges, particularly those who came from private 
law firms where they grew accustomed to collective problem solving whereby 
partners and associates would brainstorm on how to handle certain cases. Fur-
thermore, some magistrate judges found the more solitary experience on the 
bench required adjustment,107 and occasionally were motivated to seek specific 
feedback from the assigned district judge regarding their procedural prefer-
ences.108 However, one magistrate judge expressed frustration with the lack of 
feedback from district judge colleagues.109 
Mentoring of new judges, of course, is not new. Nonetheless, it does not 
appear the impact of mentoring on judicial decision-making behavior has re-
ceived much attention. Quite frequently when a new district or magistrate judge 
joins a district court, the Chief Judge, of the district, designates a colleague to 
serve as a mentor judge to their new colleague. Such mentoring can involve 
providing guidance on almost any question a new judge may have about their 
new position, from library and staffing resources to internal court procedures, 
but also can include discussions regarding case management in general, or in 
specific cases, as well as the utilization of magistrate judges. Mentoring, how-
ever, is not the exclusive province of district judges. 
Several magistrate judges also commented that as new district and magis-
trate judges join their court, they bring with them experiences from either civil 
or criminal practice, but generally not from both. Hence, experienced magistrate 
judges reported that in addition to mentoring new magistrate judges, they occa-
sionally found themselves serving as unofficial mentors to the new district judges 
in the areas in which the new judge lacked prior experience. Such mentoring 
                                                        
105  This is a procedure I have invoked from time to time when presiding over Multi-District 
or other complex litigation. 
106  Interview with subject 23 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
107  Interview with subjects 7, 29 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
108  Interview with subject 25 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
109  Interview with subject 7 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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sometimes took the form of case specific discussions with the new judge to which 
both were assigned, or more general discussions regarding civil or criminal case 
management or procedure, or other areas in which the new judge needed a pri-
mer.110 At other times mentoring took the form of a more detailed order or a 
report and recommendation to the district judge, where the magistrate judge took 
greater pains to explain the basis for their ruling than might otherwise be neces-
sary were the magistrate judge writing for a more experienced colleague on the 
district court.111 As one former magistrate judge, now serving as a district judge, 
described his approach: “You try to be sensitive to the assigned district judge’s 
case management preferences and still lead with your recommendation, but per-
haps also offer alternatives for their consideration.”112 While some who are not 
judges might find this ad hoc mentoring of district judges by magistrate judges 
surprising, the judges involved did not. Rather it seemed to them a sensible man-
ner of addressing the responsibility of fairly resolving the cases before them. 
C. Size Matters and so Does Collegiality 
The judges interviewed often emphasized the importance of collegiality 
among the judges on their court. To the judges interviewed, collegiality meant 
more than being friendly or considerate of one another, but also adhering more 
fully to a common purpose to fairly adjudicate their cases and respect for the 
abilities of each other to work toward that goal. In particular, several judges in 
smaller districts reported that a strong personal and professional relationship ex-
ists between the magistrate judges and district judges, either because they came 
from a relatively small legal community, or in some cases even from the same 
law firm or public entity. In such circumstances, the working relationships be-
tween the judges tended to be less formal and the expectations of one toward the 
other were understood even when unspoken.113 Judges from larger districts also 
reported similar experiences where a prior professional relationship had been es-
tablished between individual colleagues before joining the federal bench.114 The 
impact of collegiality also appears present in districts that are geographically 
very large or heavily populated, where the district court is divided into official 
or unofficial divisions headquartered in distinct communities sometimes located 
hundreds of miles apart, particularly where those locations of holding court were 
fairly small.115 
Some district and magistrate judges from districts which are relatively small, 
in terms of population, caseload, and number of judges, yet geographically vast, 
noted that they rely heavily on each other to discharge as full a range of duties 
                                                        
110  Interview with subjects 9, 20, 25 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
111  Interview with subjects 5, 20, 23 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
112  Interview with subject 2 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
113  Interview with subjects 13, 29, 3 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
114  Interview with subject 1 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
115  Interview with subjects 18, 26 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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as possible to ensure cases are handled expeditiously in the various court loca-
tions in their districts. Where there are an insufficient number of Article III dis-
trict judges to populate each such locale, a magistrate judge who resides in that 
location may be more readily accepted by the bar as the only federal trial judge 
conveniently available. In such circumstances, especially where the magistrate 
judge in that location had established credibility with the local bar over years of 
practice or on the bench, the tendency to consent to magistrate disposition of a 
case in accord with § 636(c) appeared to be greater. Similarly, in such districts, 
magistrate judges may be more heavily relied upon by their colleague district 
judges to handle such criminal proceedings as changes of plea and supervised 
release violation hearings, which would involve preparation of a report and rec-
ommendation to the assigned district judge regarding proposed final action. 
Some judges also identified such options as viable because they conserved the 
scarce resources available to the courts, United States Probation Office, United 
States Attorney, Federal Public Defender, and United States Marshal’s Office.116 
Not surprisingly, changes in the makeup of the individuals serving as district 
judges and magistrate judges were reported by some magistrate judges to impact 
both their decision-making behavior as well as the utilization of magistrate 
judges in their district. Understandably, most interviewees reported that when 
magistrate judges and district judges work together over several years on a par-
ticular court, they become familiar with each other’s preferences. However, be-
cause the collaborative working relationship between a magistrate and district 
judge may vary from judge to judge, several interviewees reported there is a pe-
riod of adjustment when a new magistrate or district judge joins a district court. 
This adjustment period includes a dialogue extending beyond a single case spe-
cific conference, or general court-wide discussions regarding case management, 
and includes the manner in which the magistrate judge crafts a ruling, or a district 
judge handles an objection to a magistrate judge’s ruling.117 
Collegiality, and the size of the court, also appears to influence district judge 
decision-making with respect to how to utilize magistrate judges. While most 
characterized the utilization of magistrate judges as increasing over the years, a 
couple noted some backsliding in utilization and involvement regarding matters 
of court governance as the makeup of the individuals serving as district judges 
and magistrate judges has changed. For example, one magistrate judge with sev-
eral years of experience noted that as new district judges join the court, a few are 
more hierarchical in their approach, and may consciously, or unconsciously, treat 
magistrate judges as less worthy of participation in court governance.118 Such 
judges also may be less inclined to encourage district wide schemes to promote 
                                                        
116  Interview with subjects 17, 18, 26 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
117  This comports with my experience and general comments of several interviewees. 
118  Interview with subject 8 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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§ 636(c) consents in civil cases, essentially with the view, “Why should magis-
trate judges get all the good civil cases?”119 
Another magistrate judge with many years of experience highlighted the sig-
nificance in the 1991 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 632, which changed the title 
“magistrate” to “magistrate judge.”120 That amendment was in part designed to 
ease some of the hierarchical stratification between district and magistrate 
judges, which it did, but there was a lag with some district judges embracing the 
new title, which in the minds of some diminished the magistrate judge posi-
tion.121 The interviews conducted suggest this phenomenon was rare, and it is 
difficult to identify or quantify a reason for such a perceived change of direction 
beyond the personalities and philosophies of the judges involved. 
However, if collegiality can be viewed as a positive influence on judicial 
decision-making behavior, to what extent does the absence of collegiality pro-
duce the opposite effect? While the interviews conducted produced only a few 
examples of lack of collegiality between judges, it appears that not all judges 
share a collegial or even friendly relationship with one another. This can un-
doubtedly influence the manner in which decision-making authority is divided 
between district and magistrate judges. The reasons for this appear to be as com-
plicated as the personalities of the judges involved. But the judges interviewed 
commonly noted the prevalence of a professionally respectful, and purposeful 
relationship among the district and magistrate judges of their court with regard 
to the adjudication of cases.122 
D. Magistrate Judge Utilization and Judicial Decision-Making Behavior 
“The evolution of the magistrate judges system since 1968 shows the federal 
judiciary’s capacity to address the growing and increasingly complex civil and 
criminal caseloads that have confronted the federal courts.”123 Nothing better il-
lustrates that capacity than the flexibility in utilization of magistrate judges 
throughout the ninety-four United States district courts. Commenting on the vast 
array of judicial decision-making responsibilities discharged by magistrate 
judges, one district judge, who had not previously served as a magistrate judge, 
characterized magistrate judges as “heavily utilized, and underappreciated.”124 
However, because utilization of magistrate judges varies so significantly in some 
districts and evolves to meet the changing needs of each individual district court, 
it becomes more difficult to precisely define the judicial decision-making roles 
of magistrate judges and district judges in a single model.  
                                                        
119  Interview with subject 11 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
120  Interview with subject 24 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
121  Id. 
122  See generally Interviews cited throughout Part III. 
123  Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 5. 
124  Interview with subject 10 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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Under the statutory framework embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 636, the district 
judges of each district, generally in collaboration with their non-Article III mag-
istrate judge colleagues, revise as necessary the manner in which magistrate 
judges are utilized, that is, the way in which they share or divide case decision-
making responsibilities.125 The utilization of magistrate judges may even vary 
among the various official or unofficial divisions within a district for a variety of 
reasons, including the demands of the district court caseload. Magistrate judge 
utilization also can reflect the preferences of counsel who litigate regularly in 
federal court as is illustrated by their decisions whether to consent to proceedings 
before a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.§ 636(c). This again involves an exer-
cise of judicial decision-making by the district judges who first must decide to 
designate magistrate judges in their district to receive civil cases on consent of 
the parties, and thereafter must approve or disapprove the transfer of a specific 
case to the magistrate judge when § 636(c) consent is tendered.126 Hence, the 
decisions made in each district concerning the manner in which magistrate judges 
will be utilized is a significant manifestation of judicial decision-making behav-
ior because it determines the case specific judicial decision-making responsibil-
ities of both district judges and magistrate judges. 
As the caseload dynamics of each district have evolved, and as the judges on 
the court have changed, the details of magistrate judge utilization also have 
changed from district to district based on experience and experimentation. A few 
examples illustrate this point. 
 The District of Oregon, for example, has long incorporated magistrate 
judges in its civil case draw on an equal footing with district judges.127 In the 
District of Nevada, magistrate judges in the unofficial Las Vegas Division are 
assigned responsibility for initially adjudicating all non-dispositive motions in 
civil cases, and also all dispositive and non-dispositive motions in criminal cases, 
whereas in the unofficial Reno Division, magistrate judges are generally not as-
signed pre-trial motions in criminal cases.128 In the Western District of Washing-
ton, magistrate judges are directly assigned Social Security and Section 1983 
                                                        
125  I have personally witnessed this occur during my thirty-five years on the federal bench. 
126  Here it may be appropriate to draw a parallel to the exercise of judicial decision-making 
behavior by judges of the courts of appeal to invoke the assistance of Article III district judges 
to sit by designation with their court. Does such behavior reflect effort aversion or leisure 
preference? Or does it reflect a thoughtful and practical decision to enhance the ability of the 
courts of appeal to administer more effectively their caseload at a particular moment and in 
light of judicial resource limitations on the appellate court? It seems reasonable to assume the 
latter, particularly because including district judges on court of appeals panels allows for a 
valuable sharing of perspectives among the two Article III cadres—a learning experience for 
both. 
127  Interview with subject 28 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
128  Based on the author’s professional experience. 
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prisoner cases.129 If the parties do not consent in accord with § 636(c), the mag-
istrate judge retains the case for pretrial purposes, including preparation of re-
ports and recommendations regarding case dispositive matters.130 In the Northern 
District of California, the District of Idaho, and at certain divisional locations in 
the District of Montana, the courts have adopted a procedure whereby consent is 
assumed in a specified share of the civil caseload draw if the parties do not timely 
object.131 The utilization of magistrate judges in Arizona differs regionally be-
cause the enormous number of criminal cases arising near the border with Mex-
ico warrant utilization of magistrate judges to take pleas of guilty and select ju-
ries in felony cases in Tucson, but not in Phoenix.132 
The very act of parsing the judicial decision-making responsibilities of dis-
trict judges and magistrate judges reflects the court governance decision-making 
of each district court, and helps define the structural relationship between the 
district and magistrate judges of that district. Further, it segregates the cases, or 
parts of cases, with respect to which Article III or non-Article III judge will ac-
tually perform a judicial decision-making function. Do such institutional court 
decisions reflect the collective effort aversion, aversion to appeal, or leisure pref-
erences of the district judges on each particular court? The interviews of the mag-
istrate judges and district judges suggest that, with minor exceptions, such con-
siderations do not influence their behavior. 
The judges interviewed responded that the scheme for utilization of magis-
trate judges in their districts was driven by a variety of factors. Among these 
were changes in the district’s caseloads, changes in relevant statutory or case 
law, or federal or local rule, and the experience levels and skill sets of the district 
and magistrate judges involved. Another factor often cited was local culture, not 
only within the district court, but also among the practicing bar in each locale. 
Undeniably, a huge factor in the development of magistrate judge utilization has 
been the unavailability of Article III judicial resources, in the form of district 
judgeships, which have been in chronically short supply. This has repeatedly 
driven requests for additional magistrate judgeships in many districts which 
simply could not secure additional district judgeships, or could not fill existing 
vacancies given the seemingly perpetual institutional incapacity, or unwilling-
ness, of the Executive and Legislative Branches to do so. In this regard, one dis-
trict judge in a very busy district, who formerly served as a magistrate judge, 
                                                        
129  Interview with subject 32 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
130  Id. 
131  See MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FACILITATING 
CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF CASE-DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITY IN CIVIL CASES (Mar. 2009) (on 
file with author). 
132  Interview with subject 11 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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quoted a fellow district judge, as once saying, “I could solve the caseload prob-
lem right now by appointing all magistrate judges as district judges because they 
already can do the job.”133 
Nearly every district articulates its utilization scheme in its local rules, gen-
eral orders, internal templates, or a combination thereof.134 A few magistrate 
judges observed that some district judges will deviate from the standard utiliza-
tion procedure in their district and may refer matters to a magistrate judge either 
because of the complexity of the case or because they are overwhelmed with 
pending motions. As characterized by one magistrate judge, the district judge in 
the latter instance may simply be trying to get the file “off their desk because 
they could.”135 That magistrate judge noted that informing the district judge that 
they had deviated from standard procedure was always an option, but as with 
others, indicated they would simply handle whatever matter was referred.136 The 
sentiment of most magistrate judges was well stated by one who said he knew 
the district judges were working hard to address a variety of cases, and some-
times face a crushing criminal caseload, and considered it the responsibility of 
the magistrate judge to assist the district judges in whatever manner they 
could.137 
Otherwise, throughout the interviews conducted, the concepts of aversion to 
effort, and appeal, or leisure preference did not seem to fit. The discussion fo-
cused more on efficiency in coping with growing caseloads, and comments by 
several judges about attempting to achieve the goals expressed in Rule 1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, satisfying the demands of the Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990 (“CJRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482, and meeting the mandates 
of the Speedy Trial Act under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 in criminal cases.138 
The impact of the CJRA, which is commonly referred to in federal courts as 
the civil speedy trial act, warrants particular attention. As several commentators 
have observed, the CJRA has resulted in increased utilization of magistrate 
judges to satisfy the emphasis on early involvement by the court in case manage-
ment.139 Combined with statutory changes to the Federal Magistrates Act, and 
expansive judicial interpretation, the CJRA has contributed to much of the inno-
vative utilization of magistrate judges chronicled throughout this paper.140 How-
ever, although the subject was not raised by any judge during the interviews, it 
                                                        
133  Interview with subject 4 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
134  28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012); Michelle H. Burns, U.S. Magistrate Judges: The Breadth and 
Depth of Their Service, FED. LAW. 63, 63 (May/June 2014). See generally D. Nev. Loc. R. IB 
1-1 (2011). 
135  Interview with subject 20 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
136  Id. 
137  Interview with subject 23 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
138  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012). 
139  Baker, supra note 5, at 665–67, and articles cited therein. 
140  See Shannon, supra note 27, at 253. 
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also may be productive to explore whether the semi-annual CJRA case reporting 
deadlines motivate district judges to refer matters to magistrate judges they oth-
erwise might retain. 
Variances in magistrate judge utilization in many districts also has led to 
specialization in some areas. Commenting on the wide range of duties assigned 
to magistrate judges in various districts, one magistrate judge noted it is predict-
able that magistrate judges would develop expertise in particular kinds of cases 
or adjudicative functions.141 For example, where the caseload demands of a dis-
trict, perhaps combined with the skills of the magistrate judges in that district for 
pre-trial case management, or conducting settlement conferences, or conducting 
civil trials on consent of the parties, it is fairly natural for the district judges of 
the court to rely on its magistrate judges to address such matters. Another mag-
istrate judge explained that when such areas of utilization are carved out for mag-
istrate judges in a particular district, this tends to impact the types of applicants 
who seek appointment as magistrate judges in that district, as well as the types 
of candidates selected by the district judges to serve that utilization need.142 
In sum, while the judges interviewed identified a variety of factors as influ-
encing magistrate judge utilization, leisure preference, or aversion to effort, or 
appeal were not among them, and only rarely did the factors identified tend to 
suggest such behaviors. 
E. Cases Adjudicated by a Magistrate Judge on Consent of the Parties 
As seen in the foregoing section on utilization, substantial effort has been 
expended in many districts to encourage parties to consent to full case dispositive 
decision-making authority before magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
The success of these efforts is demonstrated by the fact that for the twelve-month 
period ending September 30, 2013, 15,803 civil cases were fully adjudicated by 
magistrate judges on consent, and 14 percent of all civil jury trials, and 143 non-
jury trials were conducted by magistrate judges on consent of the parties.143 But 
there is more to this story than raw statistics can provide. When a district judge 
approves the reassignment of a case on his or her docket to a magistrate judge in 
accord with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), that district judge has exercised his or her judi-
cial decision-making discretion by deciding for whatever reason that transfer to 
a magistrate judge for all adjudicatory purposes is appropriate. Thereafter, the 
district judge is no longer responsible for the case. Appeal of any dispositive 
rulings made by that magistrate judge, including a final judgment, will be taken 
directly to the relevant court of appeals.144 
                                                        
141  Interview with subject 19 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
142  Interview with subject 11 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
143  See supra Part I. 
144  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (2012). 
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Most magistrate and district judges reported that concerted efforts had been 
made in their districts to encourage § 636(c) consents in civil cases where prac-
tical.145 The manner in which this was accomplished, however, took many forms. 
While opposition to encouraging civil consent cases was not expressed by any of 
the judges interviewed, there do appear to be some who feel utilization of mag-
istrate judges for such purposes is either unnecessary or raises potential consti-
tutional issues.146 Otherwise, some efforts to promote civil consent cases took 
the form of putting magistrate judges on the wheel for case draw with respect to 
a particular number or percentage of civil cases, or for specified categories of 
cases such as prisoner civil rights, habeas corpus petitions, or Social Security 
appeals.147 Other districts invoked a written notice of right to consent to proceed 
before a magistrate judge, followed by either a deadline to exercise such consent 
or ad hoc encouragement by district and magistrate judges at pretrial conferences 
to consider the option.148 One message conveyed by most district and magistrate 
judges was that the success of efforts to encourage § 636(c) consent in civil cases 
was dependent not only on both the perceived ability of the magistrate judges to 
effectively adjudicate such cases and the confidence displayed by the district 
judges of the court who approved the consent, but also rested heavily on the cul-
ture of the local bar.149 
One magistrate judge reported that their district was experimenting with a 
procedure by which counsel can jointly consent to proceed before one of several 
magistrate judges.150 This approach appears to permit a type of forum shopping 
not typically seen in United States district court. The view expressed was that the 
fact that the assigned district judge retained control over whether to approve the 
transfer on consent was sufficient to avoid an overwhelming number of consents 
to any particular magistrate judge thereby nullifying potential abuse.151 
A district judge, who was a former magistrate judge, noted that their district 
strongly promoted consent to magistrate judges in civil cases not only by placing 
magistrate judges on the wheel for civil case draw, but also by providing in a 
General Order that no dispositive civil motions would otherwise be referred to a 
magistrate judge.152 This judge explained further that some district judges would 
permit counsel to select the magistrate judge before whom they would consent 
                                                        
145  See supra note 131, at 22. 
146  See, e.g., Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (1984) (Posner, 
J., dissenting). See generally Interviews cited throughout Part III. 
147  See generally Interviews cited throughout Part III. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Interview with subject 30 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
151  Id. 
152  Interview with subject 12 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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so as to place the case before a judge with experience in a particular area, such 
as intellectual property or employment discrimination.153 
Another district judge, who previously served as a magistrate judge, indi-
cated considerable success in securing consents by placing magistrate judges on 
the wheel for draw of prisoner civil rights and pro se cases. When asked whether 
the decision to limit civil consents to these areas was a matter of “efficiency” or 
a “roll down the hill” determination, the judge responded, “More the latter, 
though it also served efficiency.”154 
The circumstances above raise a legitimate question concerning whether in 
deciding which types of cases to refer to magistrate judges as potential consent 
cases, the district judges involved designate the types of cases they find less in-
teresting, (i.e. prisoner civil rights or Social Security), or in a hierarchical sense, 
less worthy of their attention, as better suited for reference to a magistrate judge. 
It may be useful to examine further what motivates the district judges in some 
district courts to refer civil consent cases without distinction as to the type of 
litigation involved to those districts that carve out certain types of cases for civil 
consent consideration. In particular, it may be useful to explore whether such 
decisions regarding magistrate judge utilization are driven strictly by the case-
load needs of the district or by other considerations. 
Is the judicial decision-making behavior of magistrate judges any different 
when adjudicating a case fully on its merits rather than by way of pre-trial rulings 
subject to review by a district judge colleague on the same court? The interviews 
conducted suggest that in some instances it may be. 
One magistrate judge, from a very large district, commented that when han-
dling dispositive or non-dispositive motions in cases without § 636(c) consent, 
the magistrate judge would not hold a hearing unless necessary.155 In compari-
son, when the case was before that magistrate judge for full adjudication on con-
sent of the parties, there was a tendency to more regularly grant a hearing because 
the parties had consciously selected the magistrate judge to hear their case.156 
This tendency may reflect a motivation to encourage parties to consent to future 
proceedings before a magistrate judge. 
One magistrate judge, who adjudicated cases on consent of the parties, re-
sponded that they might be more summary in their rulings on motions because 
the prospect of appeal was remote, or at least more abstract.157 These views were 
consistent with those of district judges interviewed who viewed the prospect of 
                                                        
153  Id. 
154  Interview with subject 4 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). This behavior might properly be charac-
terized as an example of effort aversion on the part of district judges in a court wide structural 
sense. 
155  Interview with subject 30 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
156  Id. 
157  Interview with subject 27 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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appeal to the court of appeals as only marginally influential to their merits deci-
sions, in part, because it is somewhat remote and there is no way for the deciding 
judge to know whether there even will be appellate review.158 By comparison, a 
magistrate judge’s decision on a motion absent § 636(c) consent is always sub-
ject to what one district judge described as an immediate “elevator appeal” to the 
assigned district judge.159 Another district judge, who formerly served as a mag-
istrate judge, observed that when a magistrate judge is presiding in a civil case 
with full dispositive and trial authority, there is virtually no prospect of influence 
by the district judges, because every appeal would lie with the court of appeals.160 
In contrast, when the magistrate judge acts on a motion in tandem with a district 
judge, there is an awareness that “you did not want to mess up the district judge’s 
case.”161 
When cases proceed before a magistrate judge on consent of the parties pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the magistrate judges acts as a de facto Article III 
judge. There is no further review before the formerly assigned district judge, and 
appeal lies directly to the pertinent court of appeals.162 Under such circum-
stances, does the prospect of appeal influence the judicial decision-making be-
havior of the magistrate judge any differently than it does an Article III district 
judges? The responses of the judges interviewed suggest there is no difference. 
This is interesting because while Article III district judges are appointed for 
life, magistrate judges serve eight-year terms, subject to reappointment to suc-
cessive eight-year terms by their district judge colleagues through a process of 
review which entails the opportunity for comment from the members of the bar 
regarding the incumbent magistrate judge.163 Naturally, this would include coun-
sel who had participated in civil consent cases before that magistrate judge. Also, 
during the reappointment process the reviewing district judges would be privy to 
the reversal rate of the magistrate judge before the court of appeals in civil con-
sent cases. It is unclear what those skilled in the use of “indirect methods” and 
“sophisticated quantitative tools”164 would find if they compared the 14 percent 
of the civil cases fully adjudicated by magistrate judges with the 86 percent ad-
judicated by district judges in this regard, and whether the results of such analysis 
would square with the results from the interviews of judges involved.165 Regard-
less, the consequences from the failure of prior studies to account for the role of 
magistrate judges is well illustrated in the area of civil consent cases under 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c). 
                                                        
158  Interview with subject 15 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
159  Id. 
160  Interview with subject 12 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
161  Id. 
162  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (2012). 
163  MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, THE SELECTION, 
APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 38 (2010). 
164  See supra Part II. 
165  See supra Part I. 
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F. Magistrate Judge Participation in District Court Governance 
The development of the Magistrate Judges System demonstrates vividly the 
self-governing capacity of the federal judiciary. The management of this rela-
tively new and valuable judicial resource has largely been accomplished through 
the governing structures of the Judicial Conference of the United States, circuit 
judicial councils, and through the governing structure of each district court. 
Moreover, magistrate judges have themselves played a pivotal role in court gov-
ernance thereby contributing to the development of the Magistrate Judges Sys-
tem. 
As the policy making body of the federal courts, the Judicial Conference 
relies heavily on the work of its committees to study and address all manners of 
important details relating to the operation of the federal judiciary, including 
budget, security, space and facilities, federal rules, and the Magistrate Judges and 
Bankruptcy Judges Systems, among others.166 Similarly, the structure of most 
circuit courts of appeals provide for circuit committees addressing some of these 
same areas, and many others relating to the courts within their circuit.167 So, too, 
do the governing structures of many of the ninety-four United States district 
courts.168 At each level in this judicial governance structure, magistrate judges 
have become full participants with representatives serving on, and sometimes 
chairing, many national, circuit and district court committees.169 Magistrate 
judges also are represented on the Board of the Federal Judicial Center, the re-
search and training arm of the federal judiciary, as well as most advisory com-
mittees of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.170 
This representation did not occur overnight. Rather, as interaction between 
magistrate judges and their Article III colleagues increased, and as reliance on 
magistrate judges grew with their expanded utilization, it was inevitable that they 
also would have a seat at the table of court governance. Here again, the opportu-
nities for district judges and magistrate judges to influence the judicial behavior 
of one another are myriad. 
Does participation by magistrate judges in the governance of the district 
court in which they sit reflect judicial decision-making behavior of the district 
judges and magistrate judges, and does it impact their decision-making behavior 
in cases before the court? The interviews conducted suggest that it does, and 
provide examples of both.  
                                                        
166  See generally Governance & the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/PPT5-JFXK] (last vis-
ited Apr. 28, 2016). 
167  See, e.g., Judicial Council, U.S. CTS. FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ju-
dicial_council/judicial_council.php [https://perma.cc/C4TF-7DGE] (last visited Apr. 28, 
2016). 
168  See, e.g., Judicial Council Overview, NEV. CTS., http://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Administra 
tion/Judicial_Council/Overview/ [https://perma.cc/L3AJ-4S5J] (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
169  Based on the author’s professional experience and knowledge. 
170  Id. 
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No research is necessary to support an assumption that as different layers of 
judges share experiences and solve problems within the scope of the various na-
tional, circuit, and district court committees, a respectful relationship develops 
between the judges. This relationship enhances the mutual understanding of their 
respective roles, and the interconnection between their judicial responsibilities. 
Anecdotally, I can attest to the growth in understanding and respect between cir-
cuit, district, and magistrate judges, after representatives from each of those sec-
tors of the federal judiciary served jointly on the Judicial Conference Committee 
on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System, which I chaired in the 
mid-1990s. The impact was palpable as senior and active circuit and district 
judges worked closely with their magistrate judge counterparts to address a wide 
range of issues that came before that Committee. Not surprisingly, each gained 
insight regarding the responsibilities and challenges encountered by the other in 
the discharge of their judicial duties. The same dynamic occurs within each dis-
trict court where magistrate judges participate with their district judge colleagues 
on almost every court committee, and participate in much of the court govern-
ance decision-making for that court.  
This relationship is significant for reasons extending beyond the mutual un-
derstanding and respect engendered. It has a direct bearing on the judicial deci-
sion-making of the respective cadres of judges, most particularly the district and 
magistrate judges. District judges manifest their judicial behavior not only in de-
ciding whether to seek authorization for additional magistrate judge resources to 
meet their growing caseloads, and in deciding who to select for each magistrate 
judge position, and later whether to reappoint them, but most importantly in how 
to utilize the magistrate judges on their court. These elements speak to a form of 
judicial decision-making, which has been largely untouched by those writing 
about district judge behavior. Judicial decision-making behavior seems most 
commonly analyzed in terms of decisions rendered on the merits of a case before 
a particular judge.171 But there is a broader judicial decision-making behavior, 
which helps define who will make the merits-based judicial decision, and the 
manner in which the judicial decision-making responsibilities of a particular dis-
trict court will be divided between district and magistrate judges. 
In this regard, one magistrate judge characterized the manner in which the 
district judges involve magistrate judges in the governance of the court as a form 
of utilization manifesting their judicial decision-making behavior and a factor in 
attracting strong candidates to apply for vacant magistrate judge positions.172 An-
other magistrate judge stressed, however, that when the district judges of a court 
select a magistrate judge to chair a committee of the district court, it is important 
that the district judges support the authority of the magistrate judge so desig-
nated.173 
                                                        
171  See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2; Judicial Business, supra note 12. 
172  Interview with subject 21 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
173  Interview with subject 20 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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Like utilization, magistrate judge involvement in district court governance 
is not uniform. Some districts employ a procedure designating one magistrate 
judge as Chief Magistrate Judge to liaison with the Chief District Judge, or dis-
trict judges on matters pertaining to magistrate judge utilization.174 Other dis-
tricts have no such formal structure, and vary in terms of magistrate judge par-
ticipation at regular meetings of the district judges of the court, or participation 
on committees of the court.175 
The same is true with respect to involvement of magistrate judges in the 
selection of new magistrate judges. Most districts have some mechanism 
whereby incumbent magistrate judges participate in this process.176 The most 
common procedure described was to permit incumbent magistrate judges to par-
ticipate in the interviews of the finalists seeking appointment as a new magistrate 
judge, and then provide their recommendations to their colleague district judges 
who formally vote on the selection.177 However, magistrate judges in two dis-
tricts advised that incumbent magistrate judges actually cast a formal vote on the 
selection of a new magistrate judge.178 
G. Magistrate Judge Auditioning for Reappointment or Nomination to Article 
III Status 
The interviews of both magistrate and district judges provoked similar re-
sponses to the question of magistrate judge auditioning for reappointment and 
elevation to Article III status. Several judges commented on the differences be-
tween the magistrate judge appointment process and that employed for nomina-
tion and confirmation to Article III judgeships. 
As one former magistrate judge, now serving as a district judge, observed, 
the nomination and confirmation process for elevation to an Article III judgeship 
is “highly partisan,” whereas the magistrate judge selection process is “a brilliant 
system, more truly based on merit.”179 A magistrate judge who previously had 
been appointed and elected to state judicial office expressed the view that the 
merit selection process for magistrate judges is one of the real strengths of the 
Magistrate Judges System.180 The same magistrate judge noted that in contrast 
to the difficulty of occasionally trying to cope with Article III judges who are 
exhibiting age-related or other infirmities, yet cannot easily be eased off case 
                                                        
174  Based on the author’s experience and professional knowledge. 
175  Id. 
176  See generally Interviews cited throughout Part III. 
177  Id. 
178  Interview with subjects 6, 8 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
179  Interview with subject 16 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
180  Interview with subject 21 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
 
PRO - 16 NEV L.J. 783 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:59 PM 
818 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:783  
work, a similar circumstance with a magistrate judge could be more effectively 
addressed by means of removal, or non-reappointment.181 
Barring some performance issue, many echoed the view expressed by one 
district judge that, with rare exception, magistrate judges are almost always re-
appointed to successive eight-year terms.182 Another district judge put it more 
bluntly, “The best way to ensure reappointment is to not screw up!”183 In this 
regard, a magistrate judge opined that counsel who litigate in federal court carry 
potentially significant influence because any member of the bar can offer com-
ment on incumbent magistrate judge’s suitability for reappointment.184 The same 
magistrate judge noted that while applications for original appointment to a va-
cant magistrate judge position are customarily confidential so as to encourage as 
wide a pool of applicants as possible, in some districts such confidentiality can 
be waived by the applicant, in which case the bar again has the opportunity to 
comment.185 
On the question of whether incumbent magistrate judges consciously audi-
tioned for reappointment, the answer was again consistent among district and 
magistrate judges. As expressed previously regarding the influence of review of 
rulings by reappointing district judges,186 the question of reappointment was ba-
sically dictated by the quality of performance throughout the prior term in office. 
In sum, if the district judges of the court did not think an incumbent magistrate 
judge’s performance warranted reappointment, no amount of auditioning would 
alter the result.187 
When the issue related to magistrate judges seeking nomination to an Article 
III judgeship was raised, the responses only differed slightly. Several magistrate 
judges who are currently in188 the pool of eligibility for elevation to an Article 
III judgeship, or had been, and district judges who had garnered their judgeships 
after serving as magistrate judges, repeated the view that their auditioning for 
elevation came in the form of doing a highly credible job as a magistrate judge. 
Although most expressed the opinion that they did not view a magistrate judge-
ship as a stepping-stone to Article III appointment, one explained that the reason 
so many magistrate judges have received Article III appointments may be that 
they have demonstrated the ability to excel as a judge in the federal trial courts.189 
                                                        
181  Id. 
182  Interview with subject 15 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
183  Interview with subject 2 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
184  Interview with subject 17 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
185  Id. 
186  See supra Part III.A. 
187  See generally Interviews cited throughout Part III. 
188  At the time this article was written, several magistrate judges were in the nomination pro-
cess to become district court judges. Obviously, as the district court nomination and confir-
mation process is a political process, this may change. 
189  Interview with subject 13 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
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And, as one magistrate judge noted, they have not suffered the pitfalls of life 
outside the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.190 
Other forms of auditioning behavior were not, however, unheard of. A few 
district and magistrate judges observed that one sign of auditioning might be in-
creased activity in local or state bar activities, or in presentations at continuing 
legal education programs, or in other community activities not otherwise prohib-
ited under the Codes of Judicial Conduct.191 Those same judges, and others, also 
acknowledged, however, that since many judges routinely engage in such bar 
and community activities, this is probably weak indicia of auditioning for eleva-
tion or reappointment.192 
One district judge, who had previously served as a magistrate judge, com-
mented that magistrate judges wishing to garner support for elevation to Article 
III status might make a more concerted effort to encourage civil consent cases to 
get more face time with attorneys who might thereafter have influence with those 
making recommendations for nomination to the district court.193 This approach 
may be limited by the fact that the political process by which potential nominees 
are recommended to the President for nomination to Article III judgeships can 
vary in each State. Others noted that an auditioning magistrate judge might be 
more circumspect in comments on politically charged topics, or might be more 
conscious of actions that could offend counsel.194 However, with respect to each 
of these behaviors, the same judges observed that it is difficult to ascribe such 
conduct to auditioning, because such circumspection and humility is a generally 
preferred mode of conduct for judges whether they are seeking promotion, praise, 
or simply trying to do their job well.195 In the end, the tenor of most responses 
was that the latter motivation tended to enhance any judges chances of elevation, 
or reappointment, within the structure of the federal judiciary. 
 What does the fact that 162 magistrate judges have become Article III 
judges in the past forty-five years, or that several currently pending Article III 
nominees are incumbent magistrate judges, tell us about magistrate judge audi-
tioning for Article III promotion?196 Perhaps further study comparing behavior 
                                                        
190  Interview with subject 34 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). The Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges, originally adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1973, applies to 
United States circuit judges, district judges, magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, Court of 
International Trade judges, and Court of Federal Claims judges. See Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-
united-states-judges [https://perma.cc/R2H2-DEQ9]. 
191  Interview with subjects 2, 15, 19 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
192  Interview with subject 28 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
193  Interview with subject 14 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
194  Interview with subjects 3, 5, 11, 14 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
195  Interview with subject 13 (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014). 
196  E-mail from Thomas Davis, Attorney Advisor of the Judicial Servs. Office, to Philip Pro, 
Former Chief Judge of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Nev. (Dec. 26, 2103, 12:19 PST) 
(on file with author). This number is accurate as of Dec. 26, 2013. Id. 
 
PRO - 16 NEV L.J. 783 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:59 PM 
820 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:783  
of Article III judges who previously had served as magistrate judges, with those 
who had not, would be revealing.  
Somewhat surprising, the interviews conducted with magistrate judges sug-
gest that a great many have no promotional aspirations, and hence elevation is 
not an influential factor in their judicial behavior.197 Less surprising was the view 
expressed by others that because of their age, or the partisan political alchemy 
prevalent in their state, they did not consider themselves to be in the pool of 
eligibility for appointment to an Article III judgeship, and thus entertained no 
thoughts of auditioning for such an appointment.198 In the end, it appears that the 
question of auditioning is dependent upon a host of variables not easily quanti-
fied, but apparently present at some level with some magistrate judges depending 
upon their particular circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Most United States district judges and magistrate judges are so consumed by 
the press of their daily caseload responsibilities that they have little time to pa-
tiently consider academic studies evaluating the determinants of their judicial 
behavior. Certainly most do not have sufficient time to write about the subject.199 
When we do, it may fairly be said that a judge may bring to the process long held 
views or barriers to self-understanding of the kind the authors of The Behavior 
of Federal Judges, and many others, are trying to penetrate indirectly by means 
of scientific methods and the use of sophisticated quantitative tools. Nonetheless, 
trial judges do tend to be practical individuals.200 Thus, this paper should not be 
understood as a gratuitous criticism of the methodology or conclusions of a very 
thoughtful study, but rather as an effort to fill a void in the current literature on 
the subject of the behavior of judges in the United States district courts. 
This paper shows that attempts to understand and explain the motivations 
for the judicial decision-making behavior of Article III United States district 
                                                        
197  See generally Interviews cited throughout Part III. 
198  Id. 
199  In this regard, I must express my deep appreciation to Dean David Levi, Professor G. Mitu 
Gulati, Professor Jack Knight, and the faculty and staff of the Duke Law Center for Judicial 
Studies, for the opportunity to participate as a member of the inaugural LL.M. in Judicial 
Studies Program. As I told Dean Levi upon enrolling in the program, as a recently minted 
Senior United States district judge, I considered it a rare opportunity to step back from my day 
to day responsibilities with the Court, and to reflect on the process in which I have been en-
gaged over the past thirty-four years. 
200  A practical approach is not necessarily unscientific. Inventor Thomas Edison was surely 
no stranger to experimentation and scientific method. Yet, in a story, which may be apocry-
phal, it is said that when hiring engineers to work at his laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey, 
each applicant was handed a large light bulb and asked by Edison to determine the exact 
amount of water the bulb would hold. The volume of the bulb could be determined by applying 
logarithmic formulas based on measurements of the bulbs surface. Edison, however, hired the 
engineers who simply removed the brass base from the bulb, filled it with water and then 
poured the water into a measuring cup. SUZANNE K. POWELL, CASE MANAGEMENT: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN MANAGED CARE 85 (2d ed. 2000). 
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judges are weakened by the failure to account for their non-Article III magistrate 
judge colleagues. By tracing the relatively short history of the Magistrate Judges 
System, and exploring the evolving judicial decision-making role of magistrate 
judges, this paper also demonstrates that the interrelationship between United 
States district and magistrate judges is inescapable, and profoundly important to 
the resolution of most cases litigated in United States district court.  
The interviews of thirty-four Ninth Circuit district and magistrate judges re-
ported herein illustrate the scope of judicial decision-making of magistrate 
judges. The interviews also demonstrate the dependence of district and magis-
trate judges on each other in ways not commonly recognized as case determina-
tive. The interviews offer no panacea for those seeking to understand the judicial 
behavior of judges in the United States district court. Still, the interviews tell us 
much about who these judges are, and reveal useful insights, which should not 
be discounted by those seeking to measure judicial behavior by more sophisti-
cated, but indirect methods.  
The interviews summarized in this paper suggest that the decision-making 
behavior of district and magistrate judges in the United States district court is 
motivated by an amalgam of factors not easily quantified, and not necessarily 
shared equally by all judges. Whether categorized as serving a particular ideo-
logical or policy preference, or the judge’s own self-interest, the motivations for 
their judicial behavior are as complex as the judges themselves. This may not be 
a particularly useful observation because it permits those conducting a study of 
judicial behavior to read into their analysis almost any reasonable motivation 
they wish. Under such circumstances, it is “enough,” but hardly ironic that, “the 
arrows fit exactly in the wounds that they have made.”201 The interviews do, 
however, evidence a unifying desire on the part of nearly every judge to be per-
ceived as credible, competent, and fair. 
The interviews show also that the multi-varied motivations of judges must 
be understood in the context in which the judicial behavior is manifested. In the 
end, it is enough that this paper shows that when attempting to understand the 
determinants of judicial behavior in the United States district courts, the collab-
orative and inter-dependent judicial decision-making of both district judges and 








                                                        
201  FRANZ KAFKA, DIARIES 402 (Shocken Books, Inc., 1948). 
